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1NTERNATIONAL lAW
INTERNATIONAL LAV.*
Not the least among many legacies bequeathed to us by
the great war is a markedly increased interest in the theory
and practical conduct of international relations. The struggle
itself was characterized by an extraordinary volume of argu-
ment both between the actual combatants and between com-
batants and neutrals. Where the latter were concerned
governments approached at times perilously near an actual
outbreak of hostilities, and differences disclosed were start-
ling in their divergences from supposed standards. The
effects were naturally disquieting, and it must be admitted
by all friends of international jurisprudence that the very
being of the science as an efficient and living organism is now
doubted in many quarters, while other views, although more
moderate, tend to place the existing system in the category
of things whose imagined utility if indeed fully realized
might prove desirable, but whose weakness will not permit
the assumption of working form. Nor are such conceptions
in any manner surprising if there is recalled the fact that the
most acrimonious word-engagements of the war time were
carried on between foreign offices of administrations con-
fessedly in the forefront of culture and civilization but whose
utterances, nevertheless, touching the solution of problems
among the most serious and far-reaching of any which could
enlist human interest, were diametrically and persistently
opposed. We have here a background in view of which it is
certain that highly pessimistic forecasts of the future are well
justified. If we admit that the law of nations may exhibit a
mechanism sufficiently adapted to secure harmony and pros-
perity in time of peace, what, it may still be asked, has the
*By Gordon E. Sherman, formerly Professor of International Law,
Yale Law School.
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general plan to show for itself as a humanizing and restrain-
ing influence in the clash of warfare? And in the light of facts
revealed by a candid reply to such an inquiry, -is there a
remedy at hand or in sight? Will it be sufficient to appoint
grave-minded committees charged with the responsibile duty
of assembling and sifting the acknowledged elements of
international law and diplomacy in order to offer for accept-
ance a more conisistent and possibly chastened though similar
body of principles and rules as the basis of a scheme full of
promise? Or must we look far more deeply into the problem
and explore its aspects in the light of ethics as well as lawT
After all, is international law, in any adequately defensible
interpretation, law at all as that term is applied in practical
and national life?
Law, itself, in a community politically constituted, may
be defined as an enforceable rule of action. That is to say,
there must be organized and compelling strength sufficient
to execute accepted principles and decisions; there must be
an assured guaranty that the determinations of the polity
will be carried out to the full as announced. Such a result
follows where law is supported by adequate sanctions; fail-
ing such support, law must equally fail of its true mission.
If we can posit no such sanction for international law, it is
plain that it cannot be characterized as law in the highest
sense but must be held to be removed by an unbridgeable
chasm from what we understand to be law in a sovereign
state where unlimited executive power can at all times be
called upon to enforce obedience to its prescriptions. Such
law has ever behind it the collective imperium whose will is
final and not to be denied: "If man were to live in a state
of nature, unconnected with other individuals," says Black-
stone,1 "there would be no occasion for any other laws than
the law of nature and the law of God. Neither could any
other law possibly exist: for the law always supposes some
1. 1 Commentaries, 43.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss4/3
INTERNATIONKAL LAW
superior who is to make it; and in a state of nature we are
all equal without any other superior but him who is the
author of our being. But man was formed for society; and,
as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject, is neither
capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it.
However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind
to be united in one great society, they must necessarily divide
into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and
nations, entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to
a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to
regulate this mutual intercourse called 'the law of nations':
which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority
in the other, cannot be dictated by any but depends entirely
upon the rules of natural law or upon mutual compacts,
treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several com-
munities; in the construction also of which compacts we have
no other rule to resort to. but the law of nature; being the
only one to which all communities are equally subject: and
therefore the civil law very justly observes, that quod
naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus
gentium."
Is it, however, practically conceivable that a body of
principles, although ever so skillfully adapted to the har-
monious conduct and progress of world relations, can assume
to be clothed with controlling force if the political units with
which it has to deal are severally sovereign and independent
of one another? Can sovereignty, in other words, consistently
recognize an objectified superior? Before we can safely
adopt the affirmative, it becomes essential to glance at the
development of thought which, despite adverse happenings
and discouraging experiences, has given to the world a science
with which it cannot dispense and which if now re-established
and firmly upheld will be found to contain the secret of future
progress alike in national and international life.
In a classical passage touching our subject, Blackstone
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thus outlines a difficult problem :2 "How the several forms
of government we now see in the world at first actually began
is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite
disputes. It is not my business or intention to enter into
any of them. However they began, or by what right soever
they subsist, there is and must be in all of them a supremej
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the
jura summmi imperii or the rights of sovereignty reside. And
this authority is placed in those hands, wherein (according
to the opinion of the founders of such respective states, either
expressly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the
qualities requisite for supremacy, wisdom, goodness, and
power, are the most likely to be found."
International law, though by no means of lecent origin,
is nevertheless, as contrasted with general jurisprudence
itself, a comparatively late-comer in a world whose civiliza-
tion owes it much. But the recognition of a law of nations
as a distinct department of public law dates from the six-
teenth century only, though it had not lacked foreshadowings
more or less imperfect anl fragmentary in the legal and
political theory and experience of Greece and Rome, That
theory, however, quite failed to recognize any legal system
designed to bind nations through a comprehensive corpus
lequm and hence offers a marked contrast to a true jus gen-
tiwm dealing with supposed systematic relations of states,
these latter being regarded as, in a certain though somewhat
mystical sense, an entirety or circle for the purpose of admit-
ting the existence and sufficiency of various principles and
regulations governing mutual conduct. It will be the object
of the present article to indicate briefly the sources and evi-
dences of this system. Dr. Woolsey tells us that the "law
of nations can grow up only by the consent of the parties to
it. It is, therefore, more a product of human freedom than
the municipal law of a particular state. Its natural progress
2. 1 Commentaries, 49.
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is to start from those provisions which are necessary in con-
ducting political and commercial intercourse, while it leaves
untouched, for a time, many usages which are contrary to
humanity and morality; until, with the advance of civiliza-
tion, the sway of moral ideas becomes stronger; .... opposi-
tion to external force is an aid to the highest civic virtues.
But if this were all there could be no recognition of obliga-
tions towards foreigners, no community of nations, in short,
no world. These conceptions grow up in man, from the neces-
sity of recognizing rules of intercourse, and intercourse is
itself a natural necessity from the physical ordinances of
God. Self-protection and intercourse are thus the two sources
of international law; they make it necessary, and the con-
ception in man of justice, of rights and obligations, must
follow, because he has a moral nature."'3
The course of development of international law reflects,
indeed, that which must also characterize the appearance and
growth of jurisprudence itself and flows, in similar fashion,
from a practical realization of the concepts of association and
organization. The association, too, must be reached under the
protection of justice, that is to say, its conduct must be in
harmony with man's moral endowment, or, again, it may be
said that it should accord with the nature of things as revealed
in the creative plan. Such concepts will exhibit their earliest
illustration when tribal life experiences the insufficiency of
isolation as a permanent condition and finds its continuance
altogether impracticable if man is to attain the inherently
social ends of his existence. Moreover the conduct of inter-
communication must conform, it will be discovered, to ethical
standards. Relations must be systematized to attain success
and law finally offers a solution. Such a method of thought
or action, however, is necessarily the result of long develop-
ment; thus the prehistoric community of the Homeric age
3. Introduction to the Study of International Law, 4th Ed., pp. 21-22,
and note.
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knows nothing of an organization directing its collective
strength to the enforcement of sentences intended to punish
crime or settle disputes. Law is not seen in these early pic-
tures. Even the themistes,--declarations imparted by the
gods to the chieftain (basieus), must find satisfaction, if at
all, only by way of personal execution. Homer's world, never-
theless, acknowledges a measurably effective influence spring-
ing from fear of divine displeasure together with respect for
tribal clamor. Accordingly Amphinomus tells the suitors4
that he is quite willing to slay Telemachus provided the oracle
of Zeus favors such an act but not otherwise; and, again,
Ulysses himself, relating his adventures to Eumaeus, declares
that it was the clamour of the peaple (demou phemis) which
compelled the expedition on his part to Troy.r In effect, pub-
lic opinion interprets or enforces a measure responsive to
an imagined urgency, nor is the result scarcely less effective
-than would be the enforcement of actual law in a later age.
It is fairly supposable that the friends of international law
in our own day need not doubt the compulsive strength of
world opinion where world law is to be upheld. Such a
law, however, if it is to surely prevail, must spring from no
less a foundation than the law of unchangeable right as seen
alike in ancient and modern ideals. When Greek life first
came within historical vision there appears a conception of
law clearly outlined as divine in origin, immutable and so
quite beyond either the creative or restrictive power of man.
Thus Antigone in a celebrated passage of Sophocles, declares
that her brothers shall have due burial rights accorded them
despite the contrary orders of King Creon who would thus
disregard one of the most sacred canons of Greek religious
thought :-the obligatory force of burial rites says Antigone
can be limited by no royal decree since "it comes from the
skies; its life is not of today or yesterday but for all timb,
4. Odyssey XVI., 400.
5. Odyssey, XIV, 239.
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nor does anyone know when it was instituted." Grotius, who
devotes chapter XIX, book II (De Jure Sepulturae) of his
"de Jure Belli et Pacis" to this subject, cites these lines
from Sophocles as well as the dicta of many ancient author-
ities to show a belief that burial rites, like the privileges of
embassy, are under the guardianship of religion.
In a later and historical age Greek philosophic thought
developed conceptions of law universal, destined to be inter-
preted and transmuted by Cicero and handed down by juristic
tradition as jus gentium or the law applicable to all nations
alike. Aristotle" accordingly classifies all law under the titles
of particular (idios) and common or general (koinos); or,
again, law derives its existence from nature (phusikos), or
from human institution (nomikos); that is to say law is a
regulation adopted by individual peoples for themselves, or
it is, on the other hand, the voice of reason or the natural
order not springing from agreement or institution but of its
own force binding all men. Instituted law, Aristotle adds,
may be written or unwritten. Bearing these distinctions in
mind we turn to pertinent aspects of that Roman jurispru-
dence which has bequeathed such permanent legal patterns
to our own day.
At Rome the word gentium, genitive plural of gens, was
frequently employed to mark a concept of generality o1 uni-
versality; as, for example, "ubinfam gentium," where in the
world? "minime gentium," by no means, etc. In classical
usage this term denoted:
(a) The customs of the ancient clans or gentes;
(b) The law of nature (naturalis ratio);
(c) The commercial and domestic law, regarded as a sys-
tem, common to many peoples, its principles being
those which, springing from a religious or equitable
source, might alike claim respect from all men.
6. Rhetoric 1.15; Ethics 5.17.
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(d) The usages of diplomatic intercourse and warfare-
common to Rome and many of her peoples, here ap-
proaching but not quite reaching a characterization
identical with modern international conceptions.
The Roman jus civile itself is the common law of the city-
state. Into this originally strict system of jus civile requiring
most rigiT forms of language and procedure there will have
crept in the course of time many a modifying principle intro-
duced by magistrates at the imperial demand of right deci-
sion. The application of such principles, also, would be in-
creasingly required when the commercial aspects of Roman
life had changed the one time primitive agricultural com-
munity into a complex city-state expanding to world conquest
and bringing to Rome the subjects and claims of every nation.
The name given to this new modifying system would be one
to suggest its universal application, an application which
beyond all doubt beginning in disputes chiefly between Roman
citizens claiming the protection of their own jus civile would
be now expanded to satisfy the legal pretentions of men bred
in the knowledge of equitable principles administered every-
where. It is not therefore remarkable that when Livy and
other historians came to describe ancient diplomatic and
warlike happenings, the term jus gentium should be employed
in a manner most suggestive of international law, yet in
reality the picturesque ceremonies incident to a declara-
tion of war, to a conclusion of peace, to the attestation of
treaties, etc., can scarcely claim close kinship with a modern
law of nations. Their source is seen in profound recognition
of divine superintendence marking the conduct of the ancient
city-state whose very breath of life was identified with an
exclusive conception of religious functions. While, there-
fore, it is true that the modern world has inherited much of
both form and spirit from ancient patterns (of which the
international treaties of comparatively recent times afford
many a striking example) it is, nevertheless, necessary to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss4/3
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carefully distingvsh the essential differences characterizing
times old and new. "The law," says Fustel, de Coulanges7
' 'was unchangeable because divine."
In the view of the ancient world the abstract concept of
law identified it unhesitatingly with things sacred; thus the
quality of permanence was a feature of its divine endowment.
Nor war it necessary that the law, in early ages, should be
reduced to writing since it was a part of tribal inheritance. In
the end, indeed, it was consigned to the people's sacred books
and placed under priestly guardianship. At Rome during
many centuries, it is well known, both the physical guardian-
ship of the laws and their exposition lay with the pontifices.8
In his work on Duties,9 Cicero conceives of an associa-
tion embracing not merely the clan (gens) and the city-state
but all mankind as well: ("societas est enim latissime quidein
qui pateat hominum inter homines; interior eorum, qui ejus-
dem .entis sunt; propior eorum, qui ejusdem civitatis").
Further the principles of jus gentium, he thinks, should be
admitted as part of jus civile although the converse cannot
be asserted. He tells us that the celebrated Pontifex Quintus
Scaevola, administering law both sacred and secular (in the
second century B. C.) looked with special favor on those forms
of actions and on that procedure which permitted the infiltra-
tion of bona fides into the ancient and rigid symbolic law
(jus eivile); such infiltration, says Cicero, occurred in cases
involving guardianship, partnership, trust, agency, letting and
hiring, buying and selling, etc. Now these form the special
domain, in Justinian's Corpus Juris, of the jus gentium.
It is plain that we have here the true origin of this system as
an elemental and expansive force in Roman law and, at the
first, between Romans. The authors of most modern treatises,
however, on the law of nations have supposed that jus gen-
7. La Cith Antique, Livre III, Ch. XI.
S. Cf. Fustel De Coulanges, La Cit4 Antique, Livre III, Ch. XX, La Lol
9. De Officiis 1.7; 1.16; 3.17.3.
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tium came to Rome from without being formed by, in fact-,
such adaptations from alien legal systems as might primarily
find application in suits between Romans and aliens or
between aliens claiming justice from a Roman magistrate
though not admitted to any benefit under the exclusive jus
civile. But in jus gentium the Roman had what later became
a widely extended system of private international jurispru-
dence. There was subsequently developed on this foundation
by medixval scholars a conception of public or universal law
which in the 16th century and chiefly, at first, in the writings
of theologians advanced to the idea of a systematized scheme
of jurisprudence in harmony with the order of nature (jus
naturale) and now seeking to apply to the dealings of nations
with one another principles similar. to these characterizing
the ancient Roman jus gentium. Even prior to the revival
or expansion in the 12th century of the study of Justinian,
Isidore, Bishop of Seville, gave to the world in his encyclo-
pedic work termed Etymologies (A. . 600) a picture of jus
gentium as distinguished from jus naturale and jus civile
intended to reproduce the classifications and definitions from
Justinian already noted. This work of Isidore came to be
the great reference book of medieval scholarship and assisted
in preserving through the centuries a love for the study of
Roman classical jurisprudence. In the 16th century the names
of two Spanish writers stand out with striking distinctness
amid those of many scholars seeking to examine and humanize
the principles of intercourse betveen nations both in diplom-
acy and in the ruder clashes of war: Fernando Vasquez (1509-
1566), and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), the latter a pro-
fessor of Theology in various Spanish universities. These
authors conceived of a new jus gentium which should apply
as a definite system of law between national as distinguished
from personal units, and thus fairly opened a way to the
work of Grotius a few years later. Grotius while chiefly seek-
ing to soften the prevalent savage customs of warfare, lays
down also the true principles through which alone in both
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss4/3
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-war and peace the world might hope for the institution of
more truly normal relations between peoples. War, indeed,
may be justifiable, he holds, by way of punishment for crime,
in actual self-defence, or to secure reparation for injury done.
Prior, nevertheless, to a formal declaration of hostilities
(lacking which no offensive step should be undertaken)
friendly inquiry or arbitration ought to offer, with the assist-
ance of impartial neutrals, a means of averting a struggle.
To produce a work exhibiting these many phases of his great
subject, Grotius was necessarily led to define and examine
the law of nature together with the framework of a system
which, resting on sure foundations of the imprescriptible
nature of things, should reveal possibilities of a system unit-
ing for world purposes the races of civilized mankind. In
the ancient jus gentium there already existed elements appro-
priate to the elaboration of such an ideal. To adapt prin-
ciples long familiar in history and jurisprudence, to expand
and to illustrate them with a wealth of literary citation
scarcely ever equalled, and to thus lay down for all time the
outlines of a great science, these constitute Grotius' claims
to the lasting gratitude of all men. In his great work are
reflected the reasoning and ideals of Greek tragedians and
philosophers and Roman jurists together with the immortal
spirit of Roman jurisprudence itself. The law eternal of
Sophocles and Aristotle, the association (societas) of man-
kind, of Cicero, the even-handed maxims of jus gentium are
fused in a scheme of transcendent merit.
It is important to note that Grotius, 10 in positing an
eternal and self-imposing law of rightfulness, necessarily
excludes that conception of the State which would make gov-
ernmental sovereignty a final standard of moral action. The
infallible and triumphant State of Machiavelli must accord-
ingly yield its claims before those of self-existent justice.
Precisely here we discern the value of Grotius' message to
10. 1.1.5.
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future times. As developed in the world of practical politics
the idea of Grotius leads logically to a state democratically
governed and belonging to an association of all nations
acknowledging the reign of justice and law and expressing
the spirit of Suarez in his Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legis-
latore:'1 "Humanity though variously divided into peoples
and kingdoms should yet exhibit a certain political and moral
unity springing from the precepts of nature and extending
the guidance of love and pity to all mankind."
The spirit of Grotius is best interpreted by Leibnitz12
who declares, speaking in terms of logic: "The final cause of
the law of nature is the welfare of those observing it; its
object is whatever may lie within our power to do for others;
its efficient cause is the light of eternal reason divinely kin-
dled in our hearts."
Grotius was followed by many writers seeking to inter-
pret or limit his teaching. Eminent among these was Bishop
Cumberland (1632-1718) who in 1672 published an elaborate
essay De Legibus Naturae, later (1727) translated into Eng-
lish by John Maxwell at London:-" Those propositions of
unchangeable truth," says he, "which direct our voluntary
actions about choosing good and refusing evil" constitute
natural law;13 "they impose an obligation to external actions
even without civil laws in laying aside all consideration of
those compacts which constitute civil government." These
propositions taken together "form a rule, the nature of things
for all by which the reason of all ought to be tried whether
it be right or not."114
In the same year which saw the producti6n of Cumber-
land's great work an equally important treaty was published
by Pufendorf, Prussian Councillor of State, and later (Oxford,
11. XII Theologla Cursus Completus, Column 337, Book II, Caput XIX,
Paragraph 9.
12. Opera Omnia, ed. Dutens v. 4, Part 3, p. 282.
13. Ch. 1, P. 39.
14. Ch. 2, P. 106.
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1710) translated from its Latin into English under the title
"Of the Law of Nature and Nations." Defining the subject
of his work Pufendorf says:-'-"We make enquiry into that
most General and Universal Rule of Human Actions, to which
every man is obliged to Conform, as he is a Reasonable Crea-
ture. To this rule, Custom hath given the Name of Natural
Law, and we may call it likewise the law Universal or Per-
petual."
Grotius' book saw the light in 1625 and was dedicated to
Louis XIII. Twenty-three years earlier Sully had sketched
for Henry IV an elaborate plan of international union known
as the "Grand Design." A century later Leibnitz conceived
a plan of a European Christian Republic subject to both
pope and emperor and governed by Roman law. Later still
(1795) Kant produced his famous plan for an association of
states whose collective will might guarantee international har-
miony. Kant's conception of the force of public opinion was
taken up in 1860 by Heron whose History of Jurisprudence
deserves to be better known than it is. These and many other
more or less well reasoned plans to secure international peace
are enumerated by Dr. Darby in his "International Tribu-
nals" published by the London Peace Society (1899) ; a more
complete list is contained in Mr. Arthur Call's article "The
will to end War" in the Advocate of Peace (April-May,
1924); the Covenant of the existing League, and Professor
Levermore's plan which won the Bok prize, are known to all.
In the Advocate of Peace for May, 1924, Mr. George A. Finch
of Washington outlines a most able "American Plan for an
Association of Nations" which assumes as its starting point
President Harding's memorable inaugural address of March
4, 1921.
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